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Abstract
Deep Learning NLP domain lacks procedures for the analysis of model robust-
ness. In this paper we propose a framework which validates robustness of any
Question Answering model through model explainers. We propose that a robust
model should transgress the initial notion of semantic similarity induced by word
embeddings to learn a more human-like understanding of meaning. We test this
property by manipulating questions in two ways: swapping important question
word for 1) its semantically correct synonym and 2) for word vector that is close
in embedding space. We estimate importance of words in asked questions with
Locally Interpretable Model Agnostic Explanations method (LIME). With these
two steps we compare state-of-the-art Q&A models. We show that although accu-
racy of state-of-the-art models is high, they are very fragile to changes in the input.
Moreover, we propose 2 adversarial training scenarios which raise model sensitivity
to true synonyms by up to 7% accuracy measure. Our findings help to understand
which models are more stable and how they can be improved. In addition, we have
created and published a new dataset that may be used for validation of robustness
of a Q&A model1.
1 Introduction
Up-to-date advancements in natural language processing show that it is possible to achieve high
accuracy on tasks that from human point of view require language understanding. However, recent
research on adversarial examples revealed shortcomings of neural network models, despite their great
performance on selected datasets [11]. Most adversarial examples studies in Question Answering
(Q&A) task focus on designing sophisticated attacks that prove overstability understood as an inability
of the model to distinguish sentences that answer the question from sentences that have words in
common with the question [4]. [6] and [3] also show that the whole question itself is not crucial to get
the right answer. Despite growing research in the area of adversarial attacks, little is still known about
the source of lacking robustness of Q&A models and effective ways of overcoming this problem.
In order to come up with a solution it is crucial to understand the inner workings of task specific
architectures and benchmark their performance on adversarial attacks.
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In this work we propose a model agnostic framework that checks stability of three state-of-the-art
Q&A architectures in terms of their ability to respond to semantically similar questions. We formulate
two aspects which are subject to tests: semantic input stability (relying on true semantics) and
numerical input stability (purely induced by similarity between word embeddings). These terms are
explained later on in the article. We state that a robust and reliable Q&A model should be invariant
to changes in the input until they induce semantic changes. Having said that, we state that a stable
model must display higher semantic input stability measure than numerical input stability measure.
We claim that a robust Q&A model should possess high sensitivity to true semantics, as opposed
to closeness between word embeddings. Otherwise, attacks based on commonly accessible sets
of embeddings become possible, including antonymous questions, as antonyms are often close in
embedding space.
We make the following contributions:
• We investigate robustness of the model in the face of semantic and numerical changes to the
input.
• We use output of Locally Interpretable Model Agnostic Explanations [10] to create attacks.
• We offer 2 approaches to adversarial training which increase model sensitivity to true
semantic differences by a maximum of 7% in accuracy.
• We release a collection of 1500 semantically coherent questions from SQuAD dataset [9]
preprocessed by LIME and human annotators, that we used in this study, as a reference
dataset for further works on this problem.
In section 2 we explain measures and tools that we used in the study. In section 3 we conduct
experiments on three popular Q&A architectures, then we introduce two modifications to one of the
models in order to increase ability to answer semantically similar questions and finally we refer to
related work and conclude.
2 Robustness measures
Importance of question words. Previous studies have shown sensitivity of the model to changes in
the input. Based on this notion, we use the popular LIME (Locally Interpretable Model Agnostic
Explanations) framework to assess the contribution of each question word and construct adversaries
later on, by replacing the most important word. LIME fits a linear model in local surrounding of
each example and estimates coefficients that serve as a importance measure in the process of model
interpretability. We call the most important word the keyword.
Numerical input stability. Deep learning models usually have input words represented in the form
of embedded vectors, which exhibit proximity to other words, which are not necessarily synonyms.
This results from their creation procedure, which represents a word by its neighbors. In GloVe [7]
and Fasttext [1] antonyms can be found to be close neighbors, e.g. victory is located near to defeat,
as well as up to down (0.85 cosine similarity in GloVe, they are nearest neighbors). Likewise, other
kinds of similarity which bring words close together in embedding space can be identified, such
as common hypernym, e.g. cat is very close to dog and puppy. Overstability to numerical inputs
should be thus regarded as major vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
We use the idea of similarity in embedding space to find words that are the closest to the keyword in
SQuAD questions. We swap keywords with closest words and make predictions. GloVe embeddings
are used for extraction of closest words, since they were the input used to train the tested models.
Overall, we find that 37% of our created questions can be seen as potentially vulnerability-inducing,
containing antonyms or other severe meaning modifications with regard to original questions.
Semantic input stability. As stated above, robust model should be invariant to semantic changes.
Thus, we disregard common word embeddings and construct genuinely synonymous sentences based
on Wordnet [5] synonyms end context dependent ELMO [8] embeddings that are later on validated
by human annotators and corrected. This manually improved dataset is released for the community.
The procedure together with comparison with numerical input stability measure allows us to inspect
whether neural network understands the whole question or simply relies on numerical representation
of keywords.
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Table 1: Example alterations for question "How many people lived in Warsaw in 1939?"
Type of alteration Example sentence
Original How many people lived in Warsaw in 1939?
Synonym How many citizens lived in Warsaw in 1939?
Numeric How many those lived in Warsaw in 1939?
Random How manyrandom lived in Warsaw in 1939?
Table 2: Performance and robustness metrics for selected architectures
Architecture Numeric accuracy Synonym accuracy Rand accuracy Original EM Original F1
DrQA 0.69 0.64 0.43 0.69 0.78
BiDAF 0.70 0.65 0.48 0.68 0.77
QANet 0.72 0.70 0.51 0.69 0.79
3 Experiments
We investigate three popular architectures: DrQA [2], BiDAF [12] and QANet [14]. Each model
is tested on a prepared dataset, which comprises of examples of contexts, questions and answers
extracted from SQuAD dataset. Each question is modified so that the most important word computed
with LIME is swapped for 1. its synonym appropriate in the given context (syn-Dataset) 2. a word
which has the shortest cosine distance in GloVe embedding space (num-Dataset) 3. a word random
(random-Dataset). Table 1 shows an example of the resulting questions. In total, we produce 1500
test examples, with 500 generated by each of the 3 algorithms. Note that modifications induced by
various algorithms vary since they attend to different words in the question (as measured by LIME),
so in fact we release 3 separate datasets. In our experiments we only test on examples which scored a
correct answer in each dataset, treating wrongly tagged examples as of ambiguous merit for this task.
A merge of these three datasets can be seen as an approximation of our original datasets to be used
with any new model other than the ones we test here.
As shown in table 2, stability with regard to both semantic and numeric changes varies between
models. In general however, we find that all models respond better to changes induced by num-
Dataset than syn-Dataset, which is an unwelcome result. Indeed, all tested models are found to be
overstable to numeric manipulations while recognizing true synonyms at a lower rate. Moreover,
there is a big difference in performance once we swap keyword with random words which are on
average more distant to the keyword in embedding space. This heavy decrease in performance also
proves that indeed, models are overstable once attacked with words close to the keyword.
4 Adversarial training
In the face of our findings, a much-needed next step is to render models more robust by increasing
their ability to give right answer to the semantically similar questions. In order to increase this aspect
of model robustness we introduce two separate changes to the algorithm and choose to retrain DrQA
model, which turned out to be weak in terms of semantic similarity recognition. New models are
validated on all datasets. These changes are of model-agnostic nature and can be implemented in any
algorithm.
Table 3: Results of our adversarial training scenarios: REM (removal of random words) with 2 and 3
modified training examples added for each original example, and GRAD (propagation of gradients to
inputs) on 10,000 and 30,000 top words.
Measure benchmark REMx2 REMx3 GRADx10k GRADx30k
Numeric accuracy 0.69 0.77 (+0.08) 0.77 (+0.08) 0.76 (+0.07) 0.76 (+0.07)
Synonym accuracy 0.64 0.71 (+0.07) 0.70 (+0.06) 0.70 (+0.06) 0.69 (+0.05)
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Removing words from training dataset (REM). Inspired by logic behind dropout [13] we train
Q&A models with enriched training dataset. Each question is present in multiple forms - one question
with all words preserved and 2 or 3 questions with one random word removed. This enrichment of
the dataset enables to overcome phenomenon that may be the reason behind the success of adversarial
attacks - heavy dependence on individual words in the question. Thanks to this procedure we increase
the performance on syn-Dataset in comparison to training only on original questions. However,
it must be noted that although this improvement is a step towards answering semantically similar
questions, it does not overcome the problem of higher numeric input stability than semantic input
stability, defined in section 2.
Propagating gradients back to input embeddings (GRAD). Intuitively, a part of the Q&A model’s
knowledge of synonymy acquired during training can be transmitted to embeddings themselves.
Fine-tuning is sometimes done to increase model performance, and may be abandoned when no rise
in performance is observed. We conclude that fine-tuning the embeddings can increase the semantic
stability, independently from influencing model performance. Similarly as in REM procedure, we
obtain a rise in semantic synonym recognition, coupled with a rise in numeric accuracy.
Figure 1: Schema of robustness valida-
tion framework.
To check whether the increased numeric accuracy scores
were indeed a problem in our adversarial settings, we
tested which percentage of semantically incorrect num-
Dataset examples receive a negative score from our mod-
els. For base model, 37% problematic examples received
decision change with respect to correct original exam-
ples. With scores 38%, 36% for GRADx10 and GRADx30
respectively, these models suffer less overstability to nu-
meric modifications with regard to base model, while REM
models (34%, 30% for REMx2 and REMx3 respectively)
did exhibit increased acceptance to manipulations in nu-
meric representations.
Both methods influenced model robustness without a no-
ticeable difference in model quality measured in traditional
metrics - EM and F1. It suggests that models do need spe-
cific, established procedures for testing robustness, which
should be conducted independently from traditional per-
formance tests, since these scores are not necessarily related.
5 Related work
Researching true semantics with respect to numeric manipulations is a novel topic, although recent
research is rich with papers dealing with manipulating semantics for Q&A systems. [11] show
effectiveness of adversarial attacks on Q&A system which drop performance without significant
semantic change. [4] show a keyword detection method in Q&A using Integrated Gradients, although
they do not venture on to create attacks using important words in Q&A task. [15] generate para-
phrases of whole adversarial questions and test model robustness on these grammatically correct and
semantically similar adversaries. In our work, apart from studying semantic similarity on a more
detailed level (individual words), we propose an augmentation framework. [14] attempt to generate
adversarial examples in a non-gradient based way, in order to be able able to attack a black-box
model, a problem which we bypass using model-agnostic explainer.
6 Conclusion
In our study we focused on one particular aspect of model robustness - ability to answer semantically
coherent questions. We show that performance of all tested models decreases once we change impor-
tant question words indicated by LIME. However, we observe that models have higher performance
once we swap tokens in questions for words close in their embedding space defined by word vectors
they were trained on, in comparison to accuracy obtained by asking semantically correct questions.
We manage to increase ability of the model to answer this kind of questions but it does not mean that
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they understand semantics - it is reflected in increased accuracy of questions with GloVe embeddings
once we test our newly trained models on num-Dataset.
We show that the reason behind the success of some adversarial examples lies in the way input words
are represented. Popular embeddings do not include knowledge about real meaning of the words,
but rather incorporate knowledge about their context. Our work serves as a starting point for future
research on more semantically-conscious representation of words.
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